The Legacy of Loving by Grossman, Joanna L. & Gregory, John DeWitt
The Legacy of Loving
JOHN DEWIrr GREGORYt
JOANNA L. GROSSMANtt
Tell the Court I love my wife, and it is just unfair that I can't live
with her in Virginia.*
Richard Loving
I feel free now ... it was a great burden.**
Mildred Loving
[I would prefer to see] less mixed marriages. But if one doesn't
know any better than to mess up, let them have it.***
Georgia Governor Lester Maddox
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court sounded the death knell for anti-miscegena-
tion laws in Loving v. Virginia,1 a unanimous ruling in which Chief
Justice Earl Warren broadly and unambiguously pronounced such
laws unconstitutional as a matter of both due process and equal pro-
tection law. Of course, the ruling was immediately significant to Mil-
dred and Richard Loving, who could finally return home to Virginia
without fear of criminal prosecution and lift the veil of illegitimacy
over their three interracial children. It was also immediately signifi-
t Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Hofstra Law School.
tt Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Hofstra Law School.
J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Amherst College. Our sincere thanks to John DiNapoli, Jen-
nifer Papas and Rebecca Szewczuk for research assistance.
* Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal Narra-
tive of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229, 239 (1998) (quoting message conveyed by Richard
Loving's lawyer to the U.S. Supreme Court during oral argument in Loving v. Virginia).
** Helen Dewar, Victor in Mixed Marriage Case Relieved: 'I Feel Free Now. . . ' WASH.
POST, June 13, 1967, at All (quoting Mildred Loving in the wake of the Court's ruling in Loving
v. Virginia).
*** Court Kills Mixed Marriage Laws, Upholds King Contempt Conviction, ATLANTA
CONST. 1, June 13, 1967, at 1 (quoting Georgia Governor Lester Maddox in the wake of the
Court's ruling in Loving v. Virginia).
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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cant to some states, since they were stripped of the power to enforce
existing civil or criminal bans on interracial marriage. The day after,
news reports agreed that the decision marked the end of miscegena-
tion nationwide, even though the Court directly invalidated Virginia's
law.2 Since no American law prohibiting or burdening interracial
marriage has been enforced in the forty years since Loving was de-
cided, 3 the ruling was, in that particular sense, an effective one.
But, at the time Loving was decided, anti-miscegenation laws
were already on their way out. Only sixteen states still had such laws
on the books,4 although all but twelve had once banned such mar-
riages.' Indeed, Maryland had voluntarily repealed its anti-miscege-
nation law just a few months before the ruling in Loving was handed
down, just as fourteen other states had done in the fifteen years prior.6
And, although the Supreme Court had never addressed the constitu-
tionality of interracial marriage bans prior to Loving, two state courts
had already struck down such laws on constitutional grounds.7 So
while the Supreme Court's ruling certainly hastened their demise, the
criminalization of interracial marriage had already suffered a cultural
blow that was more wounding than the constitutional one.
How, then, does one best celebrate the fortieth anniversary of a
case that itself signaled the end rather than the beginning of an era?
On anniversaries of Roe v. Wade, for example, commentators still
have many live questions to consider about the doctrinal coherence of
the ruling, the political backlash against it, the re-emergence of anti-
abortion laws in spite of it, and the likelihood that the right it estab-
2. See, e.g., Jean M. White, Court Overturns Virginia's Ban on Mixed Marriages, WASH.
POST, June 13, 1967, at Al ("The Chief Justice's sweeping language left no doubt that similar
laws in 15 other states must fail."); Justices Upset All Bans on Interracial Marriage: 9-0 Decision
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1967, at 1 ("The wording was sufficiently broad and disapproving to
leave no doubt that the anti-miscegenation laws of 15 other states are also now void.").
3. There were a few cases post-Loving that tested the specific effects of the invalidation of
anti-miscegenation laws, but they were easily disposed of.
4. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.
5. See Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Constitutional Amendments, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 611, 627-28 (2004).
6. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.
7. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (invalidating California's ban on inter-
racial marriage on federal constitutional grounds). A court in Alabama also invalidated the
state's miscegenation ban in 1872, but the decision was subsequently overruled. See Burns v.
State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872), overruled by Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877). Many more courts
upheld their state's miscegenation laws than struck them down. See Harvey M. Applebaum,
Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49 (1964) (reviewing
cases). The retreat from bans on interracial marriage was primarily a function of legislative,
rather than judicial action. See Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegena-
tion Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1189, 1211-12 (1966).
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lished will survive pressures from an increasingly conservative Su-
preme Court.8 But similar questions are not raised by Loving, which
did not influence any presidential elections, has not been the victim of
state legislative subterfuge, and has never been vulnerable to being
overturned, even at the hands of the most conservative Supreme
Court justices.9 So what questions should we ask instead when evalu-
ating the legacy of Loving?
Loving is understood by most to be a "landmark" case,10 a refer-
ence to its perceived great import and significance to American law.
A full understanding of Loving's legacy-and the reasons for its re-
vered treatment over the years-must consider not only its immediate
effect on anti-miscegenation laws, but also its use by litigants and
courts in other legal contexts, as well as its impact on the parties, soci-
ety and culture. It is this legal, personal, and cultural legacy we try to
construct here.
In Part II we consider the influence of Loving on the law, with
respect to the right to marry, the constitutional limits on state regula-
tion of family law, and the constitutionality of race-based classifica-
tions. In Part III we attempt to place Loving in its personal, societal,
and cultural context through a canvass of selected newspaper accounts
8. Several symposia were convened on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Roe v. Wade. See,
e.g., Symposium: A Celebration of Reproductive Rights: Twenty-Five Years of Roe v. Wade, pub-
lished in volume 9 of the Women's Rights Law Reporter. The thirty-fifth anniversary in 2008,
may prove to be the most fruitful occasion to consider Roe's legacy, given the Supreme Court's
recent decision upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. See Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); see also Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, New Justices, New
Rules: The Supreme Court Upholds the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, FIND-
LAW'S WRIT, May 1, 2007, bttp://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070501-mcclain.html
(discussing the impact of Gonzales on constitutional protection for a woman's right to seek an
abortion).
9. On Loving's invulnerability, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 109 (1996) ("no respectable
scholar disputes the correctness of Loving"); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:
SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 278 (2003) ("any constitutional theory that cannot
support [Loving's] result is a constitutional theory that should not be supported"). Jill Hasday
cites these authorities as evidence that Loving is a part of the family law canon. See Jill Elaine
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 854-56 (2004).
10. Law journal articles on a wide variety of topics routinely use "landmark" to describe
Loving. See, e.g., Robert A. Destro, Loving v. Virginia after 30 Years: Introduction, 47 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1998) ("Loving v. Virginia is, by any definition, a landmark case."); Alan C.
Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1999); Nadine Strossen, In the De-
fense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143 (1994); see also Hasday, supra note 9, at 854-55 ("Legal authorities
and legal scholars consistently identify Loving as one of the most crucial decisions in family law,
illuminating family law's nature and core values."). The briefs from Loving are included in
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Philip
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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published near the time of the decision.11 We also examine academic
commentary that relates to the issues in Loving and its impact on the
practice of interracial marriage.
II. LOVING'S LEGAL LEGACY
The simple fact that decennial anniversaries of Loving are cele-
brated by law journals reveals something about its importance to the
legal canon.12 Scholars are convened to consider the "legacy" of the
case-what it has left us so many years after it was decided. This type
of legacy is similar to the one we will someday construct for Lawrence
v. Texas, a 2003 case in which the Supreme Court held Texas' criminal
same-sex sodomy law unconstitutional. 3 As in Loving, the Supreme
Court in Lawrence intervened at the tail end of an era, when most
states had already eliminated criminal bans on sodomy, if they ever
had them. Only thirteen still criminalized sodomy when Lawrence
was decided, and only four of those specifically targeted same-sex sod-
omy.14 And, also like Loving, Lawrence was instantaneously "effec-
tive" in barring states from adopting or enforcing any such law. But
putting an end to legal bans on sodomy is hardly what Lawrence will
be remembered for. It will, instead, be remembered for what it did or
did not do for same-sex marriage, and for what it did or did not do for
other laws regulating sexual conduct, such as adultery, 5 fornication,16
polygamy,1 7 incest, statutory rape,18 and even the use of sex toys. 19
11. While we realize that a larger project would justify an examination of articles in local
publications, particularly in the southern states, for our purposes here we believe that archival
material from The New York Times is fairly representative.
12. This symposium celebrates the fortieth anniversary of Loving. A conference celebrat-
ing the thirtieth anniversary of Loving, co-sponsored by Howard, Catholic, and Brigham Young
Law Schools, produced a number of articles in a symposium entitled Law and the Politics of
Marriage. See Destro, supra note 10 (describing the purpose of the conference to "provide his-
torical, legal, and interdisciplinary background to scholars and practitioners who are interested
in the ways that courts, advocates, and scholars use the Court's holding in Loving v. Virginia").
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. See id. at 573.
15. The District of Columbia enacted the Elimination of Outdated Crimes Amendment of
2003 to repeal a number of obsolete or unenforceable laws. See D.C. LAw 15-154 (effective Apr.
29, 2004) (repealing, inter alia, D.C. LAw 22-201, § 3(B), which criminalized adultery).
16. See, e.g., Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005) (invalidating Virginia's criminal ban
on fornication in light of Lawrence).
17. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006) (upholding state's ban on polygamy
against Lawrence challenge).
18. See, e.g., State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005) (invalidating sentence escalation for
statutory rape involving two parties of the same sex under Lawrence).
19. See Joanna L. Grossman, Is There a Constitutional Right to Promote the Use of Sex
Toys?, FINDLAw's WRrr, Jan. 27, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040127.html
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Although Lawrence has already been invoked in a wide range of
cases, four years is too few to sit back and conjure up a legacy, or
celebrate an anniversary.
It's not too soon for Loving, though. Forty years is plenty to jus-
tify this question: What has Loving meant in American law? Loving's
legal and doctrinal legacy is three-fold. Loving has been used to de-
fine and affirm the fundamental right to marry, to enforce federal con-
stitutional limits on domestic relations, and to invalidate racial
classifications and other practices that perpetuate racial
subordination.
A. Loving and the Right to Marry
The contemporary battle over same-sex marriage has given Lov-
ing a renaissance. The rhetorical parallels are too tempting to ignore,
and the few rulings that have supported marriage or marriage-like
rights for same-sex couples have made much of the similarities."0 But
let's not put the cart before the horse. How did Loving shape consti-
tutional protection for marriage in the first place?
1. Marriage in the Pre-Loving Era
Before Loving, the Supreme Court's role with respect to mar-
riage law was limited to refereeing conflicts between the states, who
had long differed over the substantive restrictions on marriage, and,
even more stridently, about the accessibility of divorce.2 ' Increasing
mobility and the rise of divorce mills made conflicts between states
about the proper regulation of marriage and divorce a common occur-
rence, disputes which reached the Supreme Court's doorstep on occa-
sion.22 Through those decisions the Supreme Court, and to a greater
extent lower federal and state courts, developed an approach to inter-
(considering the impact of Lawrence on the validity of Texas's criminal ban on the promotion of
sex toys).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 62-88.
21. Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and Some
Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87 (2004) (considering
history of interstate conflict over marriage and divorce).
22. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (ruling that North Carolina
must give full faith and credit to a Nevada divorce granted to North Carolina residents); Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) (ruling that a Nevada divorce court had no authority to terminate a
husband's obligation to provide support established under a New York decree of legal separa-
tion); see also Grossman, supra note 21, at 89-100 (considering Supreme Court's approach to
interstate conflict over divorce and related judgments). Several states competed for divorce bus-
iness by shortening residency requirements and adopting more expansive grounds for divorce.
Nevada ultimately became the premier divorce mill, and thus many of the conflicts between
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state recognition that drew on notions of comity, pragmatic considera-
tions about the need for portable personal status, and, where
applicable, principles of full faith and credit.23
There was no federal law norm about the right approach to regu-
lating marriage and divorce before Loving, and thus no substantive
principles for the Supreme Court to bring to bear on the few family
law cases it heard. 4 There was, instead, merely the need for federal
courts to establish a coherent approach to interstate conflicts. This
limited involvement was thus consistent with the longstanding belief
that domestic relations law was reserved to the states. Indeed, prior
to Loving, the Supreme Court had invalidated not a single state mar-
riage or divorce law,26 despite significant variations among state
codes,27 and had often made clear its belief that marriage was a matter
for the states to regulate. As Justice Field wrote in Maynard v. Hill,
an 1888 case involving the validity of a legislative divorce granted by
the Oregon Territory to a Vermont husband:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legisla-
ture. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to
marry, the procedure or form essential to marriage, the duties and
obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both,
present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds
for its dissolution.28
states involved the enforceability of Nevada divorce decrees. See Grossman, supra note 21 (re-
viewing the history of migratory divorce).
23. See generally Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-
Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433 (2005) (describing the history of interstate conflicts
over marriage).
24. The Court occasionally made pronouncements about the importance of marriage while
elaborating on the meaning of a fundamental right for constitutional purposes, but all of these
mentions were pure dicta. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (observing
that marriage is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Meyer v. Ne-
braska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
25. See Hasday, supra note 9, at 831 ("The family law canon contends that family law is, and
has always been, a matter of exclusively local jurisdiction .... Yet contesting the family law
canon's construction reveals the existence and extent of federal family law.").
26. The California Supreme Court had invalidated the state's anti-miscegenation law on
federal equal protection grounds in 1948, but that ruling was not appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
27. See Grossman, supra note 23, at 437-43 (describing marriage law variations in the cen-
tury prior to 1967).
28. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (refusing to invalidate the legislative divorce) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878) (noting that a state has an "absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall
be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved").
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Pre-Loving, then, the Supreme Court's deference to state sub-
stantive norms regarding marriage was essentially complete. Loving
heralded a new era for the Supreme Court, however, in which state
marriage and divorce laws conflicted not only with parallel statutes in
other states, but also with developing federal constitutional norms of
equality and privacy.
2. Loving: The Ruling
The facts of Loving are familiar, but worth reiterating. Mildred
Jeter, a part-African and part-Cherokee woman, and Richard Loving,
a white man, crossed the border in 1958 from their home state of Vir-
ginia to neighboring Washington, D.C. to marry.29 They returned to
Virginia and set up house, but were indicted for violating Virginia's
ban on interracial marriages. "Indicted" is perhaps too polite a
description of how the Lovings became criminal defendants, however.
Early one morning, three law enforcement officers entered their bed-
room, shined a flashlight on them, and asked Richard, "What are you
doing in bed with this lady?"3 When he pointed to their District of
Columbia marriage certificate hanging on the bedroom wall, Richard
was told by Sheriff R. Garnett Brooks, "That's no good here."31 The
couple was hauled off to jail for unlawful cohabitation.
The Virginia law under which the Lovings were charged and con-
victed criminalized not only a marriage between a white person and a
"colored person" celebrated in Virginia, but also such a marriage con-
ducted out of state if celebrated by Virginia residents who left in order
to evade the state's miscegenation ban.32 (Non-whites could marry
other non-whites under the code.) The trial judge suspended the
sentences on the condition that the couple leave the state of Virginia
and not return together for twenty-five years. Explaining the sen-
tence, the judge opined:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, Malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1967).
30. See David Margolick, A Mixed Marriage's 25th Anniversary of Legality, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1992, at 120.
31. See id.
32. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4-5 (excerpting relevant Virginia statutes). Anti-evasion laws such
as this one were common, but not universal. See Grossman, supra note 21, at 100-05 (discussing
prevalence and scope of marriage evasion laws at various points in American history).
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marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix.3
3
Pursuant to the court's order, the Lovings moved to the District
of Columbia, but returned to Virginia four years later and filed a mo-
tion to vacate their convictions on federal constitutional grounds.34
They challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia law under both
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In striking down the law, the Supreme Court reached
three important conclusions. First, the Court dispensed with the no-
tion that state power to regulate marriage was unlimited. Although
earlier cases like Maynard v. Hill used broad language to describe
state legislative control over domestic relations, Loving made clear
that state marriage laws must comply with federal constitutional
norms. As the Court stated, Virginia "does not contend in its argu-
ment before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlim-
ited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nor could it do so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska and Skinner v.
Oklahoma."35 The Court thus established a role for federal courts in
hearing challenges to state marriage laws and for the constitution in
circumscribing them.
Second, the Court concluded that Virginia's miscegenation ban
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As discussed in greater detail below, it is the state's proffered defense
to this particular challenge-and the Supreme Court's repudiation of
it-that has proved the most important aspect of Loving's legacy. Vir-
ginia argued that "because its miscegenation statutes punish equally
both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage,
these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not
constitute an invidious discrimination on the basis of race."36 And if
the classification is not invidious, Virginia contended, the Court
should consider only whether there was any "rational basis" for the
state to adopt and further a policy of discouraging interracial mar-
riages.37 The Supreme Court roundly rejected Virginia's approach,
however, and put the so-called "equal application" theory to rest. Ap-
33. Id. at 3 (quoting trial judge).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). These cases struck down, respectively, a law banning foreign
language instruction for certain children and a compulsory sterilization law for certain criminals.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id.
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plying the "most rigid scrutiny, '3 8 the Court found no sufficiently
compelling purpose to justify Virginia's racial classification. Rather,
the Court concluded:
The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the classifications must stand on
their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy.... There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom
to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.39
This ruling was sufficient to invalidate the Virginia law, but the Court
did not stop there.
The Court also concluded that Virginia's miscegenation ban also
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our
very existence and survival."4° This aspect of the holding drew prima-
rily on Skinner v. Oklahoma, a case in which the Supreme Court
struck down as a violation of substantive due process a state law im-
posing compulsory sterilization as a penalty for some forms of theft
but not others.41 The Court viewed the right to marry as akin to the
right to avoid involuntary sterilization and thus deserving of due pro-
cess protection. The Court also cited Maynard v. Hill in support of its
due process analysis, but that case had only to do with the desirability
and importance of marriage as a social institution and nothing to do
with a constitutional right to enter it. With little discussion, however,
the Court concluded that Virginia's law was inconsistent with due pro-
cess protections for marriage. But even this aspect of the Court's rul-
ing clearly hinged on race:
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications
so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens
of liberty without due process of law. Under our Constitution, the
38. Id. at 11 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
39. Id. at 11-12. The Court found support in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), a
little discussed case in which it had invalidated a Florida law banning cohabitation by interracial
couples. See also id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that they "cannot conceive of a valid
legislative purpose ... which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is
a criminal offense").




freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.42
The immediate import of Loving was clear: states no longer had the
power to prohibit interracial marriages. But, as the next sections will
explore, the ruling had broader import as well.
3. The Right to Marry After Loving
Because of the inextricable link in Loving between the invidious-
ness of the racial classification and the fundamental nature of mar-
riage,43 the impact of Loving on other types of marriage restrictions
was not predetermined. The ruling certainly did not signify the Su-
preme Court's willingness to generally override state law with respect
to marriage, nor to view all marriage prohibitions as equally invidious.
Just five years later, the Court dismissed an appeal in Baker v. Nelson,
one of the first cases to challenge (unsuccessfully) a state's refusal to
permit same-sex couples to marry, "for want of substantial federal
question."'  Published dissents from the denial of certiorari in several
cases in the 1970s and 1980s perhaps reveal a broader dispute on the
Court about the appropriateness of federal intervention into state
laws regulating marriage and other intimate relationships.45
The Court did, however, revisit the scope of the federal constitu-
tional right to marry in two important cases after Loving. In 1978, the
Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, struck down a Wisconsin statute that
prohibited noncustodial parents who were behind on support obliga-
tions and whose children were on welfare from marrying without prior
court approval. 46 The Court began its analysis with Loving-in its
words, the "leading decision" on "the right to marry. '47 Truth be told,
in 1978, Loving was the Court's only decision on the right to marry.
Drawing on Loving, Skinner, Griswold v. Connecticut,48 and the
Court's view of marriage's importance as espoused in Maynard v. Hill,
42. Id.
43. See Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1448
(2004) ("Today, most courts and scholars see the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as
discrete bases for strict scrutiny. But in Loving, the two clauses operated in tandem.").
44. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
45. See, e.g., Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (refusing to review public library's decision to dis-
charge two employees because of nonmarital coparenting and cohabitation); Whisenhunt v.
Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (refusing to
review police department policy disciplining two offers for nonmarital cohabitation).
46. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
47. Id. at 383.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the plurality in Zablocki characterized marriage as a right "of funda-
mental importance," the infringement of which warranted heightened
scrutiny. Between the time of Loving and Zablocki, the right of pri-
vacy had been broadened to include a panoply of rights regarding
marriage, family, intimate relationships, and reproduction.49 In
Zablocki, the Court found the importance of the right to marry suffi-
ciently fundamental to justify "critical examination" of laws that sig-
nificantly interfere with it.50
Zablocki was not, however, a due process case.51 It was, instead,
a case decided under the now moribund fundamental rights branch of
the Equal Protection Clause. So Zablocki did not establish absolute
protection for the right to marry; rather, it stands for the proposition
that classifications that directly and substantially interfere with the
fundamental interest in marriage must be subjected to heightened
scrutiny. Though Zablocki was an equal protection case, and Loving
stopped short of declaring marriage a fundamental right in its due pro-
cess analysis, the two cases together have been understood to establish
that "the right to marry counts as fundamental for constitutional
purposes. 52
Zablocki, moreover, made clear that the Court's unwillingness to
tolerate certain marriage restrictions was not limited to those drawn
on the basis of race. The defendant in Zablocki, after all-a Cauca-
sian, teenage father of an out-of-wedlock child with a new pregnant
girlfriend-was part of no "suspect" class.53 Justice Powell argued in
his concurrence in Zablocki that the majority was overreading Loving
by applying it outside of the race context, though he agreed with the
49. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (the right to live with non-
nuclear family members); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (the right to
continue working while pregnant); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right to seek an abor-
tion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (the right of single people to obtain
contraceptives).
50. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383. The precise standard adopted in Zablocki authorizes "rigor-
ous scrutiny" for marriage regulations that "interfere directly and substantially with the right to
marry." Id. at 386.
51. For a helpful discussion of Zablocki and its relationship to Loving, see Laurence C.
Nolan, The Meaning of Loving: Marriage, Due Process, and Equal Protection (1967-1990) as
Equality and Marriage, from Loving to Zablocki, 41 How. L.J. 245 (1998).
52. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2081, 2087 (2005).
53. See also Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millennium: On Equal Protection and the
Right to Marry, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 61 (2000) (noting that Zablocki "laid to rest the




majority that the Wisconsin statute must fall to the constitutional
challenge.54
A decade later, the Court took up the right to marry again in
Turner v. Safley,55 a case challenging the constitutionality of a Mis-
souri prison regulation that permitted inmates to marry only with per-
mission of the prison superintendent, approval that was to be granted
only for "compelling reasons. ' 56  There, Loving and Zablocki were
cited together as precedent for the proposition that "the decision to
marry is a fundamental right, a point so well-established it is conceded
by the State of Missouri."57 The question for the Court in Turner was
only whether that fundamental right was shared, in whole or in part,
by prison inmates. As with other rights, the Court held that prisoners
retain the fundamental right to marry, which can be burdened only to
the extent required by legitimate penological interests. 58 Here, the
Court found insufficient justification for the marriage restriction and
thus invalidated it.59 Turner completed the right-to-marry trilogy,
which provides robust constitutional protection for the right to marry
against attempted governmental intrusions.6°
4. Loving and the Lower Courts
Though the Supreme Court has not revisited the right to marry in
the two decades since Turner, matters on the marriage front have
hardly been quiet. The scope of the right to marry remains fiercely
contested because of the issue of same-sex marriage, and Loving plays
a central role in that battle. The role of Loving in same-sex marriage
cases has been given much treatment in this symposium and else-
where,6 1 but we would be remiss to not give it at least some
consideration.
54. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
55. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
56. Id. at 82.
57. Id. at 94.
58. Id. at 95. Thirteen years earlier, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case challeng-
ing the validity of a prison marriage regulation. See In re Goalen, 512 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1148 (1974). Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan,
dissented from the denial of certiorari, raising the question whether Utah's justification for the
marriage restriction was sufficient to overcome the right to marry as articulated in Loving. See
In re Goalen, 414 U.S. at 1150 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97.
60. For an interesting discussion of what the "right" to marry really consists of, see Sun-
stein, supra note 52.
61. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 109 (considering the relevance of Loving to
litigation over same-sex marriage); Mark Strasser, Loving Revisionism: On Restricting Marriage
and Subverting the Constitution, 51 How. L.J. 75 (2007).
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a. Loving and Same-Sex Marriage
Same-sex marriage advocates have invoked Loving in both a doc-
trinal sense and in a broader rhetorical one. Doctrinally, plaintiffs in-
voke Loving to argue two points: that "state regulation of the right of
access to the marital relationship is subject to constitutional limita-
tions or constraints,"6 and that banning same-sex marriage is a form
of invidious sex discrimination. The first successful use of the "Loving
analogy" in a same-sex marriage case was in Baehr v. Lewin, a 1993
case in which the Hawaii Supreme Court set the stage for the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage in that state.63
The court in Baehr first drew on Loving to define the fundamen-
tal right to marry. In Loving, the Hawaii court reasoned, the U.S.
Supreme Court had rejected the idea that a state could restrict a par-
ticular marriage or type of marriage because the "Deity had deemed
such a union intrinsically unnatural. ' 64 The Virginia trial court's infa-
mous words about "Almighty God['s]" separation of the races,65 cited
above, made clear that its decision to uphold the miscegenation ban
turned on some notion of divine law. In the Hawaii court's view, the
reversal of the outcome in Loving by the U.S. Supreme Court also
signified a repudiation of this reasoning. "[W]e do not believe," the
Hawaii Supreme Court wrote, "that trial judges are the ultimate au-
thorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demon-
strates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs
change with an evolving social order."66
The plaintiffs in Baehr also made the claim that same-sex mar-
riage bans discriminate on the basis of sex in the same way the anti-
miscegenation laws discriminate on the basis of race, pointing to Lov-
ing's rejection of the "equal application" justification for discrimina-
tion.67 In Loving, the Supreme Court refused to accept the argument
62. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993).
63. Id. at 44. At least two earlier cases had rejected the argument that bans on same-sex
marriage were analogous to bans on interracial marriage. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting argument that same-sex marriage ban violated federal constitution),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974) (rejecting
analogy to Loving because same-sex couples are "being denied entry into the marriage relation-
ship because of the recognized definition of that relationship").
64. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
65. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting trial judge).
66. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
67. In his dissent from Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court refused to invalidate Geor-
gia's sodomy law, Justice Blackmun observed that the "parallel between Loving and this case is
almost uncanny," although he did not draw the specific analogy that later took hold among
same-sex marriage advocates. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 n.5 (1986) (Blackmun,
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that Virginia's law was valid because it applied equally to whites and
blacks-whites could not marry blacks, just as much as blacks could
not marry whites. 68 Thus, states should not be permitted to ban same-
sex marriage as a matter of sex discrimination law because it means
that men are permitted to marry women, but women are not, and vice
versa. This is, the argument goes, plainly discrimination on the basis
of sex because the class of potential spouses is determined by the indi-
vidual's sex.
The Baehr majority refused to accept the argument made by one
of the dissenting judges that the ban on same-sex marriage was valid
because it "treats everyone alike and applies equally to both sexes...
[because] neither sex is being granted a right or benefit the other does
not have, and neither sex is being denied a right or benefit that the
other has.""6 The court concluded, instead, that "[s]ubstitution of
'sex' for 'race' and article I, section 5 [of the Hawaii Constitution] for
the fourteenth amendment yields the precise case before us together
with the conclusion we have reached."7 Thus, based on Loving, the
Hawaii court concluded that the ban on same-sex marriage consti-
tuted a sex-based classification. This doomed it to almost certain in-
validation since such classifications are reviewed with strict scrutiny
under the Hawaii Constitution.71 Same-sex marriage never came to
pass in Hawaii, however, because while the case was pending on re-
mand the constitution was amended to grant the legislature the power
to ban same-sex marriage, which it subsequently exercised.72
Later cases on same-sex marriage wrestled as well with the im-
port of Loving. To be sure, Loving has been routinely invoked by
plaintiffs to make the sex discrimination argument, but with mixed
J., dissenting). This analogy was urged by Professor Andrew Koppelman in his student note. See
Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98
YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988) (arguing that just as miscegenation laws were designed to maintain
white supremacy, "sodomy laws discriminate on the basis of sex - for example, permitting men,
but not women, to have sex with women - in order to impose traditional sex roles").
68. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
69. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68.
70. Id. at 68.
71. The standard of review under the Federal Constitution is nominally lower than under
the Hawaii Constitution. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing "intermediate
scrutiny" as the standard of review for sex-based classifications); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (requiring an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for a sex-based
classification).
72. See Grossman, supra note 23, at 448-49 (describing battle for same-sex marriage in
Hawaii).
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results.73 Loving has also been invoked in the same-sex marriage con-
text on the broader question of the states' right to restrict marriage
given due process protections for the fundamental right to marry, but
again with mixed results. Many courts have simply held that Loving
did not alter the nature of the fundamental right protected by due
process principles, nor did it eradicate the right of states to restrict
marriage.74
Other courts have distinguished Loving from same-sex marriage
primarily because of their view that racial classifications are uniquely
invidious and thus intolerable. The New Jersey Supreme Court in
Lewis v. Harris, for example, refused to find that the state's ban on
same-sex marriage violated the Due Process Clause of the state con-
stitution, even though it ultimately held same-sex couples were enti-
tled to equal benefits of marriage.75 For due process purposes, the
court rejected plaintiffs' reliance on Loving, noting that "the heart of
the case was invidious discrimination based on race" and that the
"fact-specific background of that case, which dealt with intolerable ra-
cial distinctions that patently violated the Fourteenth Amendment,"
provides no "support for plaintiffs claim that there is a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage."76
73. Compare Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at
*6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 25 (amended 1999) (same-sex marriage ban creates an illegal sex-based classification),
and Li v. State, No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL 1258167, at *5-6 (Or. Cir. Apr. 20, 2004) (same), and
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) (same), and Deane v. Conaway, No.
24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *4 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) ("[T]he relative genders of a
same-sex couple are the very crux of the matter."), with Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13
(Vt. 1999) (ban on same-sex marriage does not create a sex-based classification), and Standhardt
v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (same).
74. See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 879 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("Loving
did not confer a new fundamental right or hold the fundamental right to marry included the
unrestricted right to marry whomever one chooses."), affid in part and vacated in part, 47 F.3d
673 (9th Cir. 2006).
75. See 908 A.2d 196, 210 (N.J. 2006) ("Despite the rich diversity of this State, the tolerance
and goodness of its people, and the many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward
achieving social acceptance and equality under the law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex
marriage is so deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State
that it ranks as a fundamental right."). The court in Lewis was interpreting the due process
clause of the New Jersey constitution, but that clause has been interpreted coextensively with its
federal analog and the court drew heavily on U.S. Supreme Court precedents in analyzing the
issue. See id. at 207.
76. Id. at 210. Though it refused to find a due process violation, the court did rule that
equal protection principles require that "committed same-sex couples must be afforded on equal
terms the same rights and benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples." Id. at 221. It left
the decision to the legislature whether to offer same-sex couples the right to marry or some
legally equivalent alternative. Id. at 222-23. In the wake of the ruling in Lewis, the New Jersey
legislature adopted a civil union law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 et seq. (West 2007).
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Likewise, in Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court inter-
preted the state constitution to require that equal benefits be ex-
tended to same-sex couples (codified ultimately in a civil union bill), 77
but rejected the analogy to Loving as "flawed." As the court ex-
plained, "[w]e do not confront in this case the evil that was institution-
alized racism;" moreover, plaintiffs "have not demonstrated that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage was in-
tended to discriminate against women or lesbians and gay men, as ra-
cial segregation was designed to maintain the pernicious doctrine of
white supremacy. "78 Thus, even before courts that were ultimately
sympathetic to the claim for recognition of same-sex unions, Loving
has not proven to be a trump card.
Some courts refused the Loving analogy because of their percep-
tions about the differing degrees of historical entrenchment for bans
on same-sex marriage versus bans on interracial marriage. As an ap-
pellate court in California reasoned, "although anti-miscegenation
laws had been around for many years when they were declared inva-
lid," there is "no indication that interracial marriages were regarded at
the time as so unprecedented that recognizing them would work a fun-
damental change in the definition of marriage. ' 79 Indeed, an Arizona
court found a restriction on same-sex marriage implicit in Loving
itself."0
Still other courts have distinguished Loving by taking into ac-
count recent history and tradition to decide whether a fundamental
right is at stake.81 In Andersen v. King County, for example, the court
observed that "whatever the history and tradition of interracial mar-
riage had been, by the time Loving was decided, it had changed."82
77. See An Act to Create Civil Unions, 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 1201 et seq. (2004).
78. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999).
79. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 704-05 (Cal. App. 2006); see also Samuels v.
N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 29 A.D.3d 9, 19 (N.Y. App. 2006) (observing that "the law in Loving
did not seek to redefine the historical understanding of marriage, but instead involved a race-
based barrier to a traditional one woman, one man union.").
80. See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) ("Thus, while
Loving expanded the traditional scope of the fundamental right to marry by granting interracial
couples unrestricted access to the state-sanctioned marriage institution, that decision was
anchored to the concept of marriage as a union involving persons of the opposite sex.").
81. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas supports this approach. See
539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) ("We think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substan-
tial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertain-
ing to sex. History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.").
82. 138 P.3d 963, 977 (Wash. 2006).
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On that point, the right to marry someone of a different race clearly
stood on stronger footing in 1967, when only sixteen states still re-
stricted the practice, than same-sex marriage does today, when only a
single state permits such unions.8 3 However, the only court to insist
that same-sex couples be permitted to enter marriage per se read Lov-
ing differently in this regard. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, concluded that
Loving's outcome did not depend on the "full-scale retreat" of misce-
genation laws, but turned instead on a "more fully developed under-
standing of the invidious quality of the discrimination. 84
Loving has also played a less doctrinal, but still important, role in
some of the same-sex marriage cases. Take, for example, the ruling of
the appellate court in Hernandez v. Robles, which invalidated New
York's ban on same-sex marriage." Though it was ultimately re-
versed on appeal, the ruling exemplifies the rhetorical power of Lov-
ing. Justice Ling-Cohan began her opinion by describing the plaintiff-
couples before the court and noting, among other things, that the par-
ents of one plaintiff had themselves been denied the right to marry in
Texas in the early 1960s because they were of different races.86
"Thirty-eight years later," the judge noted in describing the plaintiffs
who had filed suit to challenge New York's ban on same-sex marriage,
"their son (Curtis Woolbright), his partner, and four other couples,
bring suit to secure the fundamental right to choose one's partner in
marriage. Karen Woolbright, mother of plaintiff Curtis Woolbright,
understands from her own experience a generation ago what this
means for her son."8 7 Loving's rhetorical force is not unlimited, how-
ever, and it frequently does not do the work plaintiffs ask of it.
88
83. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating the
state's ban on same-sex marriage on state constitutional grounds); see also Opinion of the Jus-
tices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (2004) (advisory opinion pronouncing invalidity of Senate bill
to adopt civil unions for same-sex couples rather than civil marriage).
84. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.
85. 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, rev'd, 26 A.D.3d 98 (2005).
86. See id. at 582.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946, 2003 WL 25279748 (Ind.
Super. Ct. May 7, 2003) (order on motion to dismiss) ("Loving in no way held that the right to
marry means the right to marry whomever one wishes. Its import is far more focused: that
whatever else marriage is about, it is not about racial segregation."); In re Marriage Cases, 49
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 708 (the analogy to Loving clearly falters given the Supreme Court's determina-
tion that the true purpose of Virginia's law was "to maintain White Supremacy").
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b. Loving and Other Challenges to Marriage Law
Outside of the same-sex marriage context, Loving has had little
relevance, if any, in challenging state regulation of marriage. Typical
state laws (historically and today) restrict marriages on the basis of
age, incest, bigamy, and mental capacity.89 Relatively few constitu-
tional challenges to state restrictions on marriage have been brought,
and Loving has played only a marginal role in them. In Moe v.
Dinkins, for example, a federal court considered the validity of New
York's statute providing that minors below a certain age can only
marry with parental consent. 90 In upholding the law, the court cited
Loving only for the basic proposition that the right to marry is funda-
mental, but quickly dismissed its relevance to the narrower question
before it since Loving did not arise "in the context of state regulation
of marriages of minors."91 And Loving was not cited at all in Potter v.
Murray City, a case indirectly upholding Utah's ban on polygamous
marriage against constitutional challenge,92 or Utah v. Holm, a very
recent case upholding a man's conviction for bigamy against a consti-
tutional challenge.93 The Tenth Circuit in Potter rejected a police of-
ficer's claim that he could not be fired for being a polygamist under
the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, noting that: "We
find no authority for extending the constitutional right of privacy so
far that it would protect polygamous marriages." 94
Because of the relative infrequency with which marriage laws are
challenged, the scope of the right to marry under Loving has not re-
ally been tested outside of the same-sex marriage context. But when
it is invoked in such challenges, Loving provides little guidance as to
the ways in which the right to marry can be restricted.9"
B. Loving, Substantive Due Process, and the Limits of Federalism
An important but sometimes overlooked aspect of Loving is its
role in establishing the federal constitutional limits on state domestic
relations laws. The validity of Virginia's anti-miscegenation law had
89. See generally Grossman, supra note 23, at 437-46 (describing historical and contempo-
rary impediments to marriage).
90. 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
91. Id. at 628.
92. 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985).
93. 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).
94. Potter, 760 F.2d at 1070.
95. See Sunstein, supra note 52 (considering whether a state could abolish civil marriage
altogether without running afoul of the fundamental right to marry).
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been litigated in an earlier case, Naim v. Naim, in which a white man
sought to annul his marriage to a Chinese woman, evasively con-
tracted in North Carolina.9 6 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia upheld the law against the constitutional challenge, observing
that "[m]arriage ... is subject to the control of the States. Nearly
seventy years ago the [U.S.] Supreme Court said [so], and it has said
nothing to the contrary since."97 In rejecting the petitioner's chal-
lenge to the miscegenation law, the Virginia court relied squarely on
the fact that marriage had traditionally been "subject to state regula-
tion without federal intervention, and, consequently. . . should be left
to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment., 98 Even though
the Supreme Court declined to review Naim,99 it made clear in Loving
that the Virginia court's ruling vastly overstated a state's power. The
Loving majority wrote:
While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage
is a social relation subject to the State's police power, the State does
not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to reg-
ulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it .... too
Loving thus cemented not only the right but also the practice of fed-
eral courts' reviewing state domestic relations laws for consistency
with federal constitutional guarantees. 01 As the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted in Wise v. Bravo, a case involving visitation interfer-
ence, "The state's power to legislate, adjudicate and administer all as-
pects of family law ... is subject to scrutiny by the federal judiciary
within the reach of the Due Process and/or Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 0 2
This repudiation of unlimited state power over domestic relations
had implications beyond the right to marry, and spurred an expansion
96. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
97. Id. at 751.
98. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (discussing Naim).
99. See generally Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand 90 S.E.2d
849 (Va. 1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). According to Pamela Karlan, the Court
"disingenuously" denied jurisdiction in order to avoid jeopardizing the effectiveness of its recent
racial equality ruling in Brown v. Board of Education by tackling the "politically incendiary"
question of interracial marriage. See Karlan, supra note 43, at 1463 n.65; see also Wadlington,
supra note 7, at 1209-10 (1966) (discussing "speculation about the meaning of the final dismissal
of Naim by the Supreme Court").
100. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted).
101. See also Destro, supra note 10, at 1218 (noting Loving's support for "federal oversight
of State power to define, regulate, and order sexual, marital, and family relationships").
102. 666 F.2d 1328, 1332 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting section 1983 claim based on police failure
to enforce visitation order) (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 1).
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of substantive due process rights more generally. Prior to Loving,
there were only a handful of cases, mostly involving attempted intru-
sions into parental autonomy, 0 3 in which the Supreme Court consid-
ered overriding a state law regarding family status or operation based
on constitutional constraints. But the body of constitutional family
law grew dramatically beginning in the 1970s, an arc triggered in part
by the Supreme Court's repudiation of Virginia's marriage law in Lov-
ing. According to Pamela Karlan, "Loving is seen today as a critical
point in the revival of substantive due process."'" 4 The number of
specific rights protected by that doctrine increased significantly in the
two decades after Loving was decided.10 5
There is now a lengthy patchwork of cases that stand for the prin-
ciple that individuals have "the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's pri-
vacy, ' '  and Loving is virtually always among those cited. Loving
thus provides support for the right not to marry as well as the right to
marry, and the related rights to make decisions over a "broad range of
private choices involving family life and personal autonomy."'01 7 The
Supreme Court includes Loving among the litany of cases collectively
establishing the contours of the right to privacy: "Choices about mar-
riage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associa-
tional rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our
society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the
State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.' "108
103. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating, on due process grounds,
statute that banned teaching of foreign language to children who had not passed the eighth
grade); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (affirming against Fourteenth Amendment
challenge parent's conviction for violating child labor law by using child to distribute religious
pamphlets).
104. Karlan, supra note 43, at 1463 n.7.
105. See cases cited supra note 49.
106. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing from the denial of certiorari) (citing, for example, Loving, Zablocki, Skinner, Meyer, and
Moore to argue for the invalidation a public employer's prohibition on unmarried employees'
living together in an intimate relationship).
107. Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S..965 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
court should consider the validity of police department's anti-nepotism policy as applied to a
nonmarried couple). Somewhat curiously, Loving is omitted from the litany of cases cited by the
majority in Lawrence v. Texas to define the "'substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process
Clause." 539 U.S. 558, 564-66 (2003). This may have been deliberate, given Justice Kennedy's
clear intent to avoid creating a precedent for invalidating same-sex marriage bans on substantive
due process grounds. See id. at 578 ("The present case ... does not involve whether the govern-
ment must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.").
108. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (invalidating a Mississippi statute requiring a
woman to prepay record preparation fees in order to appeal an order terminating her parental
rights). Loving is cited in pivotal privacy cases. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
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C. Loving and the Heightened Suspicion of Racial Classifications
As Zablocki made clear, Loving was not just a case about race.
But other cases have made clear that Loving was also not just a case
about marriage. Loving v. Virginia has come to stand for the proposi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment should be used as a sword to
stamp out vestiges of slavery. Because of the centrality of race to
Loving, the opinion has had a robust life outside of the family law
context. Indeed, some have come to understand Loving as first and
foremost a "race" case.' 0 9
The Virginia law at issue in Loving was just part of a broader
campaign against racial integration. The version of the Virginia law
challenged in Loving was adopted as the Racial Integrity Act of 1924,
and passed, according to the Supreme Court, "during the period of
extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War.""t 0
It actually tightened an existing restriction on interracial marriage to
prohibit whites from marrying a person with any black blood. As the
highest court in Virginia had explained in an earlier, unsuccessful
challenge to the law, the state's "legitimate" purposes were to "pre-
serve the racial integrity of its citizens," and to prevent "the corrup-
tion of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens," and "the obliteration of
racial pride." '111 On this record, the Supreme Court in Loving had no
trouble concluding that the law was expressly "designed to maintain
White Supremacy." 112
The Loving majority took a hard line on racial classifications,
both rejecting the "equal application" theory the state had urged (that
the law was valid because it punished whites and non-whites equally
for marrying in violation of the statute) and applying an unrelenting
form of scrutiny to the law. 1 3 The equal application theory had been
validated in an 1883 case, Pace v. Alabama, in which the Supreme
(1989) (upholding conclusive presumption of husband's paternity over constitutional challenge
from child's biological father): Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (refusing to extend the right
to privacy to include a right to Medicaid reimbursement for a medically necessary abortion):
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down New York ban on distribu-
tion of non-prescription contraceptives); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(invalidating zoning ordinance that distinguished between nuclear and non-nuclear families for
purposes of residential restrictions).
109. See, e.g., Destro, supra note 10, at 1219 ("The first and most obvious way to characterize
Loving is as a 'race' case.").
110. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
111. Naim v. Naim. 87 S.E. 2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (upholding Virginia's anti-miscegenation
law against constitutional challenge).
112. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
113. Id. at 7-8.
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Court upheld a law that punished illicit interracial sexual conduct
more severely than illicit intraracial sexual conduct." 4 Because pun-
ishment was determined by the nature of the offense (intraracial ver-
sus interracial conduct) rather than the race of the defendant, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute against an equal pro-
tection challenge. Blacks and whites were both punished less severely
for engaging in conduct with someone of the same race, and more
severely for conduct with someone of a different race.'15 This charac-
terization enabled the Court to overlook the subordinating effect of
the law under the guise of formal equality. Pace wreaked much havoc
in lower courts, which could cite it to hold back challenges to their
own miscegenation laws.
The Supreme Court officially repudiated the reasoning in Pace
three years before the Lovings' case came before it. In McLaughlin v.
Florida, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute impos-
ing a more severe penalty for interracial cohabitation than for in-
traracial cohabitation." 6 Florida defended its statute with Pace, but
the Supreme Court rejected that view as too narrow a view of the
Equal Protection Clause, though it expressly drew no conclusion
about the validity of bans on interracial marriage." 7 The Court in
Loving read McLaughlin to require "consideration of whether the
classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidi-
ous discrimination,"1 regardless of whether they appeared to impose
equal burdens on members of different races. Loving thus cemented
the death of the equal application theory with its observation that "the
fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very
heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has
traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race." ' 9
In the context of racial classifications, Loving's rejection of
"equal application" discrimination has stood firm. In Powers v. Ohio,
114. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
115. Id. at 584.
116. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
117. Id. at 188 ("In our view, however, Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court."). On
the importance of McLaughlin to the question presented in Loving, see Wadlington, supra note
7, at 1213-14 ("Although the majority of the United States Supreme Court found it unnecessary
to take the step of ruling on miscegenous marriage statutes when McLaughlin came before them,
they eliminated one of the key grounds on which state courts had previously relied to uphold
interracial marriage bans by delivering the coup de grace to the Pace rationale.").
118. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
119. Id. at 9.
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for example, the Supreme Court refused to accept the argument that
race-based peremptory challenges should be permissible if used
against members of all races.12 As the Court observed, "[i]t is axio-
matic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the as-
sumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree." '121
Loving is also cited as precedent for the level of scrutiny to be
applied to race-based classifications. Because of the "Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations," the
majority in Loving demanded more than the "rational" and "legiti-
mate" explanations the state tried to offer in defense of the statute.122
Chief Justice Earl Warren demanded that the state satisfy the "very
heavy burden of justification" required for race-based classifications
in state laws.1 23 Loving continues to be cited today for the proposi-
tion that racial classifications in a variety of contexts, including
affirmative action, 24 voting rights, 25 school financing, 26 and even
voluntary desegregation, 27 warrant the highest form of judicial
scrutiny.
Loving also continues to represent the Supreme Court's efforts to
put an end to racial subordination. The observation in Loving that the
Supreme Court has "consistently repudiated 'distinctions between citi-
zens solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"' is often
quoted. Doctrinally, Pamela Karlan has argued, "Loving marked the
crystallization, a dozen years after Brown, of the antisubordination
principle."' 28 In this vein, Loving is cited in cases like Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States, a case challenging the tax-exempt status of an
all-white educational institution, for the proposition that a policy
against racial affiliation and association is a form of race discrimina-
120. See 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
121. Id. at 410.
122. Loving. 388 U.S. at 8.
123. Id. at 9.
124. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (citing Loving and applying strict
scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of a race-conscious law school admissions policy );
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
125. See, e.g, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (citing Loving for the proposition that
racial distinctions are inherently suspect and that the Equal Protection Clause's "central man-
date is racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking"); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
126. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
127. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
128. Karlan, supra note 43, at 1447.
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tion. z9 The Court also relied on Loving in Palmore v. Sidoti, a case in
which the trial court divested a white mother of custody because she
remarried a black man.130 Citing Loving for the proposition that the
central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with
all governmentally imposed discrimination on the basis of race, the
Court concluded that private biases and the potential harm they might
inflict were impermissible considerations for courts in custody
cases.13 1 Most recently, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1,132 Loving was treated by both the con-
currence and the dissent as a cornerstone in the Supreme Court's
equal protection doctrine. In the concurrence, Loving was credited
for first establishing the principle that race-based classifications must
be subjected to strict scrutiny133 and cited in support of the claim that
governmental entities are constitutionally obligated to remedy de jure
segregation, but not de facto segregation. 34 The dissent, arguing that
the voluntary desegregation efforts of two school districts should have
been upheld, invoked Loving as one of a long line of cases illustrating
the importance of context in understanding the potential for subordi-
nation and, thus, the appropriate level of scrutiny. 135 These cases, far
afield from the core right to marry, establish Loving's importance to
constitutional protection against race discrimination.
III. THE PERSONAL AND CULTURAL
LEGACIES OF LOVING
As noted in the introduction to this essay, a significant element of
a fuller understanding of Loving and what relevance it may retain
some four decades after the Court's decision, is an examination of its
impact on the litigants themselves, as well as society more broadly.
A. The Personal Aftermath of Loving
For the Lovings, the Supreme Court's ruling paved the way for
them to return to their families and friends in their home state of Vir-
129. See 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying tax-exempt status to university based on racially dis-
criminatory admissions policy).
130. See 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
131. Id. at 432.
132. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (striking down voluntary desegregation efforts by school districts
in Seattle and Louisville as unconstitutional).
133. Id. at 2774 n.10 (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 2794.
135. Id. at 2818 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ginia. This was the ultimate goal in their legal quest, according to a
personal narrative by Robert Pratt, who knew both Richard and Mil-
dred.'36 They had "not really been that interested in the civil rights
movement," but contacted Attorney General Robert Kennedy to seek
help with what they viewed as a personal struggle.' 37 Kennedy re-
ferred their case to the American Civil Liberties Union, and two law-
yers from Alexandria took up the cause.' 38 They did not attend the
argument in the Supreme Court, and, when asked afterward what the
ruling meant for them, Richard noted only that: "For the first time, I
could put my arm around her and publicly call her my wife."' 39 The
Lovings told reporters that they had the support of their hometown
community. "Everyone here really wanted us to win the case. They
were as happy as we were at the decision."' 4 ° Richard told Life maga-
zine in a profile before their case was heard by the Supreme Court
that they "encounter hostile stares only when they venture away." 14'
Though he always wanted to "ask them what the hell they are staring
at," Richard vowed to wait until he and his wife "were allowed to live
here legally" before confronting them.'42 The Lovings' marriage en-
ded tragically in 1975 when Richard was killed by a drunk driver. Mil-
dred lost an eye in the same accident, but lived several decades more
without Richard. 43 She and Sheriff Brooks have "not exchanged a
single word," though they saw each other occasionally in Central
Point, Virginia, the small town where they both lived.144 When inter-
viewed on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the ruling in Loving, Brooks
was unapologetic about his role in arresting the couple. "I was acting
according to the law at the time, and I still think it should be on the
books. I don't think a white person should marry a black person. I'm
136. See Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal
Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229 (1998).
137. Id. at 237-38.
138. The case certainly had an impact on the lawyers, Philip J. Hirschkop and Bernard S.
Cohen, as well. As David Margolick describes, "[t]here were cold shoulders from some disap-
proving bar colleagues, nasty anonymous telephone calls, disparaging references to 'two Jew
lawyers' in the Ku Klux Klan newspaper and sugar dumped into the gasoline tanks of family
cars." See Margolick, supra note 30, at B20.
139. See Simeon Booker, The Couple That Rocked the Courts, EBONY, Sept. 1967, at 78.
140. See State Couple 'Overjoyed' by Ruling, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 13, 1967, at
BI.
141. The Crime of Being Married, LIFE, Mar. 18, 1966, at 85.
142. Id.
143. See Pratt, supra note 136, at 241.
144. See Margolick, supra note 30, at B20.
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from the old school. The Lord made sparrows and robins, not to mix
with one another.'1
45
Mildred shied away from attention and press coverage, insisting,
according to Pratt, that she never considered herself a celebrity. 14
6
She shunned efforts to recognize her contribution to the civil rights
movement. As Pratt described Mildred, after meeting with her thirty
years after the Supreme Court ruled on her case, "she still sees herself
as an ordinary black woman who fell in love with an ordinary white
man, and had they been allowed to marry without the state's interfer-
ence, that would have been the end of it."'1 47 Peggy Loving Fortune,
the youngest of the couple's three children, married a man of mixed
race. Though her parents never openly took credit for changing the
world, Peggy credited them with setting "the world free to be with
whomever they want."' 48
B. The Cultural Aftermath of Loving
To consider the broader, cultural legacy of Loving, one may use-
fully ask, having in mind the two quotations with which this essay be-
gins, whether the comments of the notoriously segregationist
Governor of the State of Georgia 149 about "mixed marriages" re-
flected a national consensus before or shortly after the time when the
case was decided. Again, while Mildred Loving's reaction to the case
is understandable in light of her personal experience of being con-
victed and sentenced to prison under the Virginia miscegenation law,
and of being forced to abandon her home state, one might speculate
that feelings may not have been as strong among other participants in
interracial unions, or those who observed, or were indirectly affected
145. See id.
146. She did eventually agree to cooperate with an HBO movie made about the case, Mr.
and Mrs. Loving, which aired in 1996. See Pratt, supra note 136, at 242.
147. Id. at 244; see Margolick, supra note 30, at B20 ("We have thought about other people,
but we are not doing it just because somebody had to do it and we wanted to be the ones. We
are doing it for us, because we want to live here.").
148. See Margolick, supra note 30, at B20.
149. Lester Maddox, a restauranteur, was charged with pointing a gun at two black men who
tried to eat at his Pickrick chicken restaurant on July 3, 1964, the day after the Civil Rights Act
was passed. He made an unsworn statement before the all-white jury that acquitted him, insist-
ing that he had pulled a pistol, but had not pointed it at "a person or an animal." Maddox
Acquitted of Weapons Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1965, at 28. Maddox's supporters stood
behind him in court wielding ax handles, which later became his symbol. He subsequently closed
his restaurant rather than serve African-Americans. Two years later, he became governor of
Georgia. See Former Georgia Governor Maddox Dies, CNN.coM, June 25, 2003, http://www.cnn.
com2003/ALLPOLITICS/06/25/maddox.dead/index.html.
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by them around the time of Loving. We begin with an examination of
selected contemporary news accounts published during the latter half
of the decade before the Loving decision and others published shortly
afterward, in an effort to place the case in context by gauging the pop-
ular or societal context that existed at the time.
Two articles published in The New York Times, both of which sur-
vey popular opinion relating to interracial marriage, are illustrative.
The first article, by Anthony Lewis, appeared in 1964, three years
prior to the Court's holding that invalidated the Virginia law anti-mis-
cegenation law,15° and the second, by William Barry Furlong, in 1968,
shortly after the Court rendered its decision.15' After pointing out that
during the preceding decade, "the legal foundations of racial discrimi-
nation in this country have been washed away in the Supreme Court,"
Lewis notes that "[o]nly one area of race relations has escaped this
judicial scrutiny, and that is the most sensitive of all-sex."' 52 Lewis
made these comments after the Court had heard arguments in Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida,53 a case that successfully challenged a Florida
law against interracial cohabitation. After musing about what "leads
people to talk about intermarriage when the issue is the killing of
civil-rights workers by Mississippi sheriffs," and why "so many
southerners introduce sex into any consideration of school desegrega-
tion or even of Negro voting rights,"' 54 Lewis observes that as a prac-
tical matter, little will change after the invalidation of miscegenous
cohabitation laws. This, he writes, is because:
only social disapproval really inhibits marriage between whites and
Negroes now. Any southern couple desiring to marry in the face of
a state anti-miscegenation law can go to a state without one. It is
the whole social apparatus of caste, and history, that makes inter-
marriage unlikely. And of course the choice is always up to the
individual. The removal of the legal obstacle would not require an-
yone to marry anyone else.' 55
Lewis assesses the impact on blacks of the invalidation of laws
against interracial cohabitation in much the same way, although for
different reasons. He states:
150. See Anthony Lewis, Race, Sex and the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1964, at
SM30.
151. See William Barry Furlong, Interracial Marriage is a Sometime Thing, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 1968, at SM44.
152. Lewis, supra note 150.
153. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).




The demise of the anti-miscegenation laws would not be immedi-
ately relevant to many Negroes, either. Studies show that the right
to marry whites is at the distant bottom of the list of Negro desires.
At the top are access to a decent job and schools, equality of service
in places of public accommodation, equal treatment by law enforce-
ment officials and other immediate issues. It is only the unusual,
highly sophisticated Negro who even thinks about intermarriage.'
56
Lewis' conclusions appear to be reinforced by the second refer-
enced article,157 which appeared shortly after Loving was decided in
1967. As the author noted at the time, Stanley Kramer's movie
"Guess Who's Coming to Dinner" and Gore Vidal's play "Weekend"
had recently appeared. The daughter of Secretary of State Dean Rusk
had married a Negro, and the daughter of Senator Edward Brooke,
himself identified as a Negro married to a white woman, was in turn
planning to marry a white man, leading to the observation that "inter-
racial marriage is in a kind of vogue, though it is hardly the racial
amalgamation that Arnold Toynbee once saw as [a route] to world
peace. "158
In the balance of the article, based on interviews in Chicago, the
author describes several black-white interracial marriages in which the
respondents describe a variety of problems, both personal and socie-
tal, that have resulted from their status as parties to a racially mixed
marriage. The author asserts that "[t]here is a singularity to each of
those marriages, though some are more singular than others. No one
couple reflects all of the woes and tribulations of marriages across ra-
cial lines, but there are some representative reactions and problems."
In the first account, for example, a "blonde woman related to a half-
Negro truck driver," is warned by her mother to stay away on week-
ends so as not to reveal her marital situation to the mother's visitors.
The mixed-race truck driver, for his part, recounts the fact that he
resented his father and "treated him like a dog because he was black"
and confesses that he is passing as white so that life will be better for
him. 159
The next story is that of "[a] Negro postal worker just over 40 and
a white woman a few years younger," who "have been married for 20
years-and isolated for about as long," who "might represent the fairly
156. Id.
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typical interracial couple.' 160 He is originally from a slum area of the
city and she from a middle class neighborhood; at the time of the ac-
count they are living in an integrated neighborhood near the Univer-
sity of Chicago. After a discreet and youthful courtship, they were
married in a simple City Hall wedding. Afterwards, the author writes,
"[hier family-like the average white in such circumstances-didn't ac-
knowledge the marriage. They feel she's living in sin because she
didn't get married in church; they also feel that she's living in sin with
a nigger. That disgraced the whole family.'
161
Subsequently, the brothers and sisters of the white wife married
and moved to newer Chicago neighborhoods or to the suburbs. She
has never gone to see her mother, who is living with one of the sisters
in the suburbs, and about whom, the author quotes her as stating:
"she's not interested; She's got plenty of other grandchildren, none of
them niggers." 162 After reading of her father's death in the newspa-
per, the woman states that she "went to the church and sat in the
back. I thought I could get in and out without anybody seeing me.
You know, you go a little late, leave a little early. ' 163 Besides family
estrangement, the woman also describes in detail other typical travails
that accompanied the "twilight world" of interracial marriage. These
included the sudden disappearance of all of the couple's relatives and
friends; the difficulty of finding new friends, either black or white; the
reluctance to face "the humiliation of traveling together, even in the
North"; the need to hide from co-workers the fact of their interracial
marriage; and even their decision, after enrolling in night classes at a
junior college, to pretend in class that they were strangers.
The article points out, however, that "[slome interracial couples
insist that they have not experienced the quiet smoldering desperation
that has been the lot of the postal worker and his wife.' 1 64 Appar-
ently representative is the Executive Director of the Chicago Urban
League, who has served in that position for ten years and has been a
party to an interracial marriage for the same length of time, and who
asserts that "[r]aces don't get married; only people do," and that he
"didn't marry a white woman" but married his wife and all the









Yet, despite these assertions, as the article points out, "the Berrys
were opposed by in-laws on both sides," and the marriage was not
celebrated in Chicago, but in Milwaukee. 166 Further, at the urging of
the prospective husband, a Chicago newspaper that had learned of the
planned wedding omitted any discussion of the fact that the marriage
would be interracial, but made the point more subtly by printing a
picture of the wife. 167
The parties to the final marriage discussed in this newspaper arti-
cle included "the daughter of Earl Dickerson, one of the richest Ne-
groes in America, "168 who met her husband, an Orthodox Jew, while
they were both pursuing graduate studies at the University of Chi-
cago. They were raising their son as a Jew, while the child of the
wife's first marriage, to a black man, was being raised as a Christian.
Problems growing out of this interracial marriage pale in significance
when compared with those in the other marriages described. The arti-
cle notes, for example:
One of their first problems after their marriage five and a half years
ago was the attitude of Steve's father who had many stereotypes
about Negroes. "He'd ask us to dinner and have watermelon just
for me," says Diane with more wonder than rancor. "Or he'd
ask-seriously-if I ate anything besides fried chicken."' 69
The white husband's account also makes no reference to the
kinds of traumatic events the other accounts mention. He observes,
with reference to his father:
"He liked to believe - as I suppose most fathers would in the same
circumstances that, as the white relative in the union, he was bring-
ing a little bit the better to the situation," says Steve. "Then, bit by
bit, he discovered that Diane's father has many of the things that
most people covet in life-great wealth and high status in the com-
munity. Eventually, I noticed that he was bragging just a bit that his
son was married to the daughter of Earl Dickerson. 17
0
One might speculate that the social and economic positions of the
parties and their families may have been a contributing factor to their





170. See Furlong, supra note 151.
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the other marriages described above, in which the participants had
significantly fewer financial resources. 7 '
Other reports in the popular press less than a decade before the
Loving decision support the conclusion that interracial marriage was
far from the most pressing or important issue of race relations in
America. For example, the Reverend Farley Wheelwright, a promi-
nent minister told the congregation of the Unitarian-Universalist
Church of Nassau County, reporting on his three day visit to Albany,
Georgia, that acceptance of interracial marriages would become just
as acceptable as interfaith marriages once schools, hospitals and res-
taurants and the like were integrated.'72 Wheelwright further ob-
served, however, that Albany residents were a long way from having
to deal with the issue, and noted that "[t]he Negro in Albany is not
concerned with marrying the white," but "[w]hat he wants today is the
vote."' 73 Another account, describing the testimony during the false
arrest suit of a clergyman who served as a Freedom Rider, reports that
the Protestant Episcopal Church supported eight of nine positions of
the Communist Party that related to race relations, including abolition
of race discrimination in the armed services. 174  The account con-
cludes, however, that "[t]he one on which he said his church had taken
no stand recommended the repeal of laws forbidding interracial
marriages.' '1 75
The positions of other religious groups in support of biracial mar-
riage were reported routinely in the national press without fanfare. In
1963, for example, the press reported briefly and without comment
that the advisory board of the Family Life Bureau of the National
Catholic Welfare Conference, described as "the spokesman for the
171. The newspaper article just discussed evoked at least one letter to the editor from a
woman who described herself as a white Jewish female mother of five children who had been
married to a black male for five years, who bemoaned the fact that writers like the author of the
article never seemed to interview people like herself, and who claimed that the only rejection
she had experienced was from her parents. She states:
My in-laws have accepted me fully: we planned to have children (otherwise why get
married?) and we are not concerned whom our children marry so long as they are good
and decent. None of my friends dropped me as a result of my marriage. We live in a
predominately white middle-class neighborhood [in Elizabeth, New Jersey] and have
been accepted without incident.
See Mrs. Belle Downing, Letter to Editor, Marriage is Color-Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1968, at
SM7.







Catholic hierarchy in the United States," had adopted resolutions de-
ploring "the attitudes and cruel behavior of American society which
penalizes and ostracizes those persons who exercise their fundamental
human right to free choice of a marital partner by entering into inter-
racial marriages.' ' 176 Some two years later, delegates attending the
General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, whose 3.3 mil-
lion members were overwhelmingly white, were presented with an ap-
parently uncontroversial position paper urging the repeal of laws in
nineteen states that at the time prohibited interracial marriage.' 77
During the decade of the Loving decision, and even before the
case began wending its way to the High Court, opposition to interra-
cial cohabitation and marriage had significantly diminished within sec-
ular institutions as it had within religious groups and congregations.
In 1963, for example, the United States Air Force ended its practice of
asking personnel whether they had married a person of another race
during their overseas tours. 178 The same year, the resolution commit-
tee of the Young Democratic Clubs of America presented to its con-
vention delegates a resolution that condemned state laws banning
interracial marriage.1 79
It would be naive, of course, to think that opponents of interracial
marriage were silent during the years leading up to Loving. Some
four years before the decision, for example, Arthur Krock, a promi-
nent New York Times writer, expressed his opinion, after the an-
nouncement that the first black woman ever admitted to the
University of Georgia had married a white fellow-student, 180 that "the
future of race relations [had] reached an inflammatory stage," and
that the Supreme Court might "find a greater opportunity to withhold
176. See Ban on Interracial Couples Assailed by Catholic Group, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24 1963,
at 16. During the same year, a statement approved at the annual meeting of the National Catho-
lic Conference for Interracial Justice made clear that race and color, unlike consanguinity, a
prior existing marriage or diversity of faith, were not impediments to marriage. See George
Dugan, Catholics Uphold Biracial Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18 1963, at 47.
177. See George Dugan, Presbyterians Urged to Oppose Bans on Interracial Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 1965, at 20; see also George Dugan, Race in Marriage Held Irrelevant, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1965, at 24.
178. See Warren Weaver, Jr., Air Force Drops Marriage Query, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1963, at
12. New York Senator Jacob Javits objected to the question, "Are you a member of an interra-
cial marriage?" after receiving a letter from an airman who protested the inclusion of the ques-
tion in connection with reassignment in the United States. Id.
179. See Democrats Asked to Oppose Antimiscegenation Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1965, at
30.
180. See Georgia Calls Negro Coed's Wedding Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1963, at 27.
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indefinitely the firebrand that a decision on the constitutionality of
[miscegenation] laws would be." '
Krock's alarums seem at best to have been overblown and grossly
exaggerated. Indeed, two months after the Court handed down its
Loving decision, Virginia's first interracial marriage was scarcely
noted.)82 And months later, the first interracial marriage in Tennessee
was celebrated on the steps of the Nashville City Hall and Court-
house.183 Alabama was the last of the states, by means of an amend-
ment of the state's constitution, to repeal its prohibition against
interracial marriage. 8 One writer observed on the eve of the vote on
the constitutional amendment:
[I]n the state nicknamed "The Heart of Dixie," the land of Bill Con-
nor and George Wallace, the movement to relinquish this searing
symbol of the past has caused barely a ripple. There are no bill-
boards on the highways, no marches for or against the repeal, no
yard signs or bumper sticker. Articles about Amendment 2, as the
ballot measure is known, are few and far between in the local
press.' 8 5
In sum, if newspaper coverage reflects or even bears on popular
opinion, during the period shortly prior to and after the Loving deci-
sion, concerns about interracial marriage seem not to have been near
the forefront of American consciousness. Yet, these articles also sug-
gest that cultural acceptance of interracial marriage was far from com-
plete, even though laws banning the practice were on the wane.
We conclude with a caveat, perhaps an unnecessary one. The
comments and observations that we make here relate solely to what
we perceive as the societal view of interracial marriage in the Loving
era. We do not mean to draw conclusions about the general state of
race relations in America at that time or now. Rather, many would
agree with a recent observation-occasioned by the firing of contro-
versial radio personality Don Imus for his racially charged description
of the women's basketball team from Rutgers University-that "ra-
cism remains a central issue in our national life." 1
86
181. Id.
182. See Virginia Ban Struck Down, Has an Interracial Wedding, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1967,
at 31.
183. See Negro and White Wed in Nashville, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1967, at 11.
184. See Susie Parker, Erasing A Remnant of Jim Crow South From Law Books, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1999, at 2.
185. See Somini Sengupta, Removing a Relic of the Old South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at
D5.
186. See Weston Kosova, imus: Race, Power and the Media, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 2007, at 29.
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C. Loving in Academic Commentary
It is surprising to find that there is a paucity of commentary in
behavioral or social science journals that address societal or popular
attitudes about interracial marriage during the decade of Loving. Al-
though a number of studies have addressed the phenomenon, their
concern for the most part, is with the incidence of interracial marriage
or, more precisely, whether or not marriages between blacks and
whites has increased, rather than with its effects, impact, or the level
of acceptance.1 87 One typical study, for example, summarizes "the
small amount of research which has been done on international and
interracial marriages" in an attempt to determine, among other things,
whether the rate of interracial marriage has increased or decreased.188
This study, and others conducted during the four years leading up to
the Loving decision conclude that there was at the time a rising trend
in interracial marriages. 189
Historical treatment of the Loving decision provides few, if any,
insights into whether it has remained a significant or important legal
landmark during the four decades since it was rendered. In what ap-
pears to be the first and only book-length historical treatment of the
decision, published in 2004, the author Phyl Newbeck, observes:
I would rank the Supreme Court case of Loving v* Virginia as one of
the major landmarks of the civil rights movement, right up there
with Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka Kansas in 1954, the
Freedom Rides of 1961, the March on Washington in 1963, Freedom
Summer in Mississippi in 1964, and the march from Selma to Mont-
gomery, Alabama in 1965. There are a variety of books, from schol-
arly tomes to personal memoirs, about all of these events, but there
is only a void regarding the Lovings and their battle to live together
legally in Virginia. Entire tomes about the 1960s devote not a single
sentence to this epic case. 190
187. See, e.g., Larry D. Barnett, Research on International and Interracial Marriages, 25 MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. STUD. 105 (1963).
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., M. Annella, Interracial Marriages in Washington D.C., 36 J. NEGRO EDUC. 428
(1967) (finding that in Washington D.C., black-white marriages "increased more than six times
between the 1946-55 and 1956-65 span"); David M. Herr, Negro-White Marriages in the United
States, '28 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. L. 262, 273 (1966) (finding a "rising trend" in interracial mar-
riage in the United States and concluding that "any increase in Negro-white marriages is likely to
bring Negroes nearer to equality with whites").
190. See PHYL NEWBECK, VIRGINIA HASN'T ALWAYS BEEN FOR LOVERS: INTERRACIAL
MARRIAGE AND THE CASE OF RICHARD AND MILDRED LOVING xii (2004). But see PETER WAL-
LENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE My WIFE: RACE MARRIAGE AND THE LAW-AN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2002) (treating the history of interracial marriage from the marriage of John Rolfe and
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Other books have given some, but not substantial attention to
Loving and its aftermath. In Mixed Race America and the Law,1 9 '
Kevin Johnson collects brief excerpts from the law review literature.
In a section labeled "The Road to Loving and Its Impact,"' 92 one
finds the edited opinion of the California Supreme Court in 1948 in-
validating that state's miscegenation law;193 a historical description of
Virginia's miscegenation laws prior to Loving;194 a narrative about
the lives of William Loving and Mildred Jeter; 195 and an edited ver-
sion of the opinion in Loving.196 Concluding the section, Professor
Randall Kennedy laments the fact that the rates of intermarriage be-
tween blacks and whites remain relatively low after Loving, offering
reasons why that is so.
In his own book, Interracial Intimacies,197 also published in 2003,
Professor Kennedy identifies 1967 as "the pivotal year" with respect
to miscegenation laws 198 and asserts that "[t]he most consequential of
the year's developments was Loving v. Virginia, the aptly named
United States Supreme Court decision that invalidated state anti-mis-
cegenation statutes.' ' 99
At a later point in his book, Professor Kennedy explicitly dis-
cusses Loving and its aftermath,2 0 0 observing at the outset that "[1]ittle
suspense attended the announcement of the Court's ruling."2 0 ' He
summarizes the series of cases that led up to the Loving decision,
describing in some detail the courtship, marriage, and prosecution of
Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter. He analyzes the Court's opinion
Pocahontas in 1614 to Loving and its aftermath). Wallenstein usefully discusses the impact of
Loving on the law of marriage in several states, and on federal death benefits, inheritance law,
custody law, and same-sex marriage. Id. at 231-45. Another academic historian characterizes
Loving v. Virginia as "the most important miscegenation case ever heard and the only one now
widely remembered," but limits her account to the fact that neither the lawyers in the case nor
the Court relied on expert opinion. See Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and
Ideologies of "Race" in Twentieth-Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44, 66 (1996).
191. See MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE LAW: A READER (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2002).
192. Id. at 41-63.
193. Id. at 43-52; see also Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
194. MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE LAW, supra note 191, at 53-55.
195. Id. at 56.
196. Id. at 60-63.
197. See KENNEDY, supra note 9.
198. Id. at 104 (noting that during 1967 the white daughter of the U.S. Secretary of State
married a black man, Loving was decided, and "Hollywood's most talked about film was Guess
Who's Coming to Dinner").
199. Id. at 105.
200. Id. at 272-80.
201. Id. at 272.
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in Loving" 2 and subsequent state cases and legislative enactments, °3
by which "formal anti-miscegenation provisions were finally erased
completely from the American legal system. ' 20 4 None of this, unfor-
tunately, enhances appreciation of Loving's impact on society and cul-
ture during the decades after the Court's decision.
Professor Rachel F. Moran's Interracial Intimacy,0 5 published in
2001, makes a noteworthy contribution to an understanding of Lov-
ing's impact. After a richly detailed treatment of the state anti-misce-
genation laws in effect prior to Loving, the doctrines, policies and
theories that underlay those laws, and the myriad judicial decisions
that challenged them, 206 Professor Moran concludes:
Anti-miscegenation laws played a critical role in defining racial dif-
ference, enforcing racial inequality, and establishing the boundaries
of proper sexual and marital practices. The Loving decision lifted
formal restrictions on intermarriage, but it would be naive to think
that the Court could instantly undo the informal assumptions and
practices that developed during three centuries of a "separate but
equal" principle in sex, marriage, and family. Loving treated race as
a biological irrelevancy by discrediting eugenic theories, but the de-
cision did not take a position on the ongoing social and psychologi-
cal significance of race in choosing a sexual partner, selecting a
spouse or raising a family. Instead, the Justices gave ordinary
Americans the freedom to rethink the role of race in their intimate
relationships. 20 7
At a later point in the book, Professor Moran turns her attention
to events that followed the Loving decision, first noting the ease with
which states complied with the decision, exemplified by the marriage
of a black man to a white woman two years later. 0 8 Yet, she observes
that despite the removal of legal barriers, "interracial marriages, par-
ticularly between blacks and whites, remain an anomaly over thirty
years after the decision, ' 209 and that "it has never been clear whether
Loving succeeded because official behavior changed or whether it
failed because marital behavior remains substantially unchanged. '210
202. Id. at 272-78.
203. Id. at 278-80.
204. Id. at 280.
205. RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY (2001).
206. Id. at 76-99.
207. Id. at 99.
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Research about patterns of racial intermarriage and racial prefer-
ence in the selection of intimate partners confirms Professor Moran's
conclusions. One recent study documented significant increases in in-
terracial marriage since the 1970s, but also noted trends that reflect
Loving's limits. 211 Interracial marriages account for only six percent
of all married couples in the United States,212 and African-Americans
remain the "least likely of all racial/ethnic minorities to marry
whites. '213 And although "the pace of marital assimilation among Af-
rican Americans proceeded more rapidly over the 1990s than it did in
earlier decades, the social boundaries between African Americans and
whites nevertheless remain highly rigid and resilient to change. 2
1 4
Data from 1990 and 2000 reveal that "race/ethnicity and color, espe-
cially the divide between African Americans and others, represent a
strong and persistent barrier to racial mixing in romance and mar-
riage. ' '2  Research on dating preferences also reveals that a signifi-
cant proportion of the population prefers to date people of the same
race.
21 6
While Professor Moran offers a number of reasons why same-
race marriage continues to persist after Loving, the following is most
pertinent for the purposes of this essay:
The most striking feature of the aftermath of Loving v. Virginia is
how readily people have accepted segregation in marriage, so long
as it is not officially mandated. Despite compelling evidence that
race continues to matter in affairs of the heart, Americans embrace
a colorblind ideal. Same-race marriages are not considered evi-
dence of racism, nor are they seen as a barrier to racial equality.
Americans overwhelmingly believe that so long as people do not
despise members of another race, they are free to love members of
their own race without legal interference or moral reproach. 27
The cultural legacy of Loving, like the law's power to transform
societal norms more generally, is thus limited.
211. See Zhenchao Qian & Daniel T. Lichter, Social Boundaries and Marital Assimilation:
Interpreting Trends in Racial and Ethnic Intermarriage, 72 AM. Soc. REV. 68 (2007).
212. See id. at 69.
213. See id. at 90.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 92.
216. See, e.g., Ginter J. Hitsch et al., What Makes You Click?-Mate Preferences and Match-
ing; Outcomes in Online Dating, (MIT Sloan Research, Paper No. 4603-06), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=895442; Raymond Fisman et al., Racial Preferences in Dating, REV. ECON.
STUD. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://www.restud.com/uploads/papers/MS-10563-2-sub-
mission.pdf.




It is hard to question the importance of a case like Loving v. Vir-
ginia to the canon of American law. It shaped two substantive consti-
tutional doctrines and recalibrated the balance of federal-state power
over domestic relations. Loving's declaration of marriage as a funda-
mental right not only has played an important role in defining the
right to marry, but also is central to the long line of cases in its wake
that broadened and strengthened a right to privacy that encompassed
decision-making over virtually all aspects of family life without gov-
ernment interference. Likewise, Loving's pronouncements about the
Constitution's intolerance for racial classifications and other vestiges
of slavery have been invoked in a wide variety of contexts and serve as
a potent reminder of the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose. The le-
gal legacy of this case, then, is clear.
Beyond the legal texts, the legacy of Loving is less well-defined.
The Lovings themselves benefited greatly from the ruling in their
favor, which enabled them to have the only thing they wanted: to live
together as a married couple in peace. And for the years before Rich-
ard's tragic death, the Supreme Court's ruling indeed granted them
that wish. Other couples in the sixteen states that still banned interra-
cial marriage benefited as well from the Court's broad pronounce-
ment that all such laws were immediately unenforceable. Those laws
would have disappeared eventually, however, since the winds were al-
ready blowing against race-based marriage restrictions in 1967. Even
if Loving had never reached the Supreme Court, it is highly unlikely
we would still have miscegenation laws in 2007. But Loving did
hasten their demise and brought immediate relief to couples, like the
Lovings, who might not have lived to see the winds of cultural change
complete their work.
Legalizing interracial marriage was an essential step toward racial
equality. For the government to deny individuals access to such an
important institution of civil society for no reason other than the color
of their skin is obviously inconsistent with notions of formal equality.
The legacy of Loving, however, seems to stop there. Interracial mar-
riages remain, forty years later, a relatively unusual occurrence, and
the black-white cultural and marital divide is still deeply entrenched.
That cultural change has lagged behind the legal change is no criticism
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Loving, but simply a reflection of the
limits of law. Had Loving come out the other way, we would certainly
not come together to celebrate its anniversaries.
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